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Regulating New Tech: Problems, Pathways, 
And People
By Cary Coglianese
New technologies bring with them many promises, 
but also a series of new problems. Even though these 
problems are new, they are not unlike the types of 
problems that regulators have long addressed in other 
contexts. The lessons from regulation in the past can 
thus guide regulatory efforts today. Regulators must 
focus on understanding the problems they seek to 
address and the causal pathways that lead to these 
problems. Then they must undertake efforts to shape 
the behavior of those in industry so that private sector 
managers focus on their technologies’ problems and 
take actions to interrupt the causal pathways. This 
means that regulatory organizations need to strength-
en their own technological capacities; however, they 
need most of all to build their human capital. Success-
ful regulation of technological innovation rests with 
top quality people who possess the background and 
skills needed to understand new technologies and 
their problems.
Visit www.competitionpolicyinternational.com 
for access to these articles and more!
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01
INTRODUCTION 
Technology brings with it great promise for improving the 
quality of life. But it can create problems too. And when it 
does, society usually turns to regulators for help. 
Although many of the problems with today’s newest tech-
nologies are themselves new, they still have much in com-
mon with the types of problems that regulators have long 
addressed. Moreover, even in this era of new tech, the main 
strategies available to regulators in the past will generally 
remain the same strategies available to them today. Regula-
tors will continue to need to focus on understanding prob-
lems and the pathways that lead to them so that they can 
take action to shape the behavior of those in industry to 
avoid or reduce the problems that technology creates. 
Most of all, regulatory agencies need to strengthen their 
organizations’ capacities to oversee new tech firms vigi-
lantly and efficiently. Toward this end, regulatory organiza-
tions will need to strengthen their own technological ca-
pacities. But most important of all, they will need, perhaps 
somewhat counterintuitively, to focus on building capacity 
in terms of their people. The key to the successful regula-
tion of technology is to find, train, and retain top quality 
people to fill the ranks of regulatory agencies, people who 
have the background and skills needed to understand the 
technologies they oversee and to regulate them effectively.
“New tech,” after all, is not a single, homogeneous 
product or process 
1 For an illustration outlining the market failures associated with online services, see Ofcom, Online Market Failures and Harms: An Eco-
nomic Perspective on the Challenges and Opportunities in Regulating Online Services (2019), https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/
pdf_file/0025/174634/online-market-failures-and-harms.pdf.
2  Cary Coglianese, Optimizing Regulation for an Optimizing Economy, 4 U. Pa. J. L. & PUb. affairs, 1, 1-13 (2018)
3  See, e.g. OECD Digital Economy Outlook 2020, OECD (NOv. 27, 2020), https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd-digital-economy-out-
look-2020-bb167041-en.htm. 
4  See, e.g. aUgUstO LOPEz-CarLOs Et aL., thE gLObaL iNfOrmatiON tEChNOLOgy rEPOrt 2006-2007: CONNECtiNg tO thE NEtwOrkED ECONOmy (6th 
ED. 2007).
5  See, e.g. miChaEL C. mUNgEr, tOmOrrOw 3.0: traNsaCtiON COsts aND thE shariNg ECONOmy (2018).
6  See, e.g. Martin Kenny & John Zysman, The Rise of the Platform Economy, 32 issUEs iN sCiENCE aND tEChNOLOgy (2016),
https://issues.org/rise-platform-economy-big-data-work/. 
7  Coglianese, supra note 3.
8  JErEmy rifkiN, thE zErO margiNaL COst sOCiEty: thE iNtErNEt Of thiNgs, thE COLLabOrativE COmmONs, aND thE ECLiPsE Of CaPitaLism (2015).
02
NEW TECH’S “PROBLEM” 
PROBLEM
Traditionally, the problems that regulators address have 
been defined in terms of market failures, such as imperfect 
competition, insufficient consumer information, and harmful 
spillovers. In addition, regulatory problems emanate from 
other normative concerns, such as fairness and equity. The 
problems created by technology still tend to fit within these 
longstanding categories of regulatory concern about mar-
ket failures and other social values1. As a result, the lessons 
learned in the past from both regulatory practice and schol-
arship can offer insight about overcoming the regulatory 
challenges created by technology today.
Yet one of the major challenges today stems from the diver-
sity and dynamism inherent in an era of rapid innovation in 
technology and its application. The problems with today’s 
technologies are themselves highly varied, changing, and 
often ill-defined. 
“New tech,” after all, is not a single, homogeneous prod-
uct or process. It comprises a broad range of distinct tech-
nologies and applications that each in its own way may 
be transforming economic transactions and other activity 
— and each that comes along with its own social and eco-
nomic concerns.2 This variability might be considered the 
“problem” problem with new tech.
You can choose your own label, but innovations today 
constitute what has been variously called a new “digital 
economy,”3 “networked economy,”4 “sharing economy,”5 
“platform economy,”6 “optimizing economy,”7 or even “zero 
marginal cost economy.”8 The range of innovations today 
is stunningly broad, including cryptocurrency, artificial in-
4 © 2021 Competition Policy International All Rights Reserved
telligence, social media, fintech, gig labor, autonomous ve-
hicles, online retail, bioengineering, the internet of things, 
precision medicine, biometric identification, and more. 
As varied as they are, today’s technologies admittedly bear 
certain common threads. To different degrees and in differ-
ent ways, they have all been made possible by advances in 
digital computing. These advances, for example, allow for 
the processing of large quantities of data using powerful 
algorithms that can be highly effective at finding patterns in 
data — often at remarkable speeds. The analysis of big data 
can allow for existing tasks to be automated, distributed, or 
organized in new ways, and these new techniques allow for 
altogether new forms of economic and social activity. 
But from the standpoint of what is needed to regulate new 
tech, these broad commonalities will rarely be enough to bring 
them under a common, unified regulatory strategy. The hetero-
geneity and dynamic nature of new tech makes for a diverse, 
and at times vaguely defined, set of problems to be solved. 
Consider that computer scientists and statisticians, for ex-
ample, do not even always agree on precisely what they 
mean by terms such as “artificial intelligence” and “ma-
chine learning.” Even when they agree on the scope of 
these terms, what travels under their banners can be ex-
traordinarily varied: distinct categories of supervised, unsu-
pervised, semi-supervised, and reinforcement learning al-
gorithms, with many different types of algorithms and data 
architectures falling within each of these categories. 
Moreover, although it is true that a certain broad set of 
concerns with machine-learning algorithms have been 
commonly characterized in terms of fairness, accountabil-
ity, transparency, and ethics, how these general concerns 
manifest themselves and exactly how they should be opera-
tionalized in specific contexts have yet to yield any widely 
accepted precise definition. 
The resolution of the problem definition question for new 
technologies will undoubtedly vary widely from application 
to application. The regulatory problems raised by an algo-
rithm used in a voice activation function in a smart phone 
will differ from those presented by an algorithm contained in 
life-support equipment used by hospitals. And these prob-
lems will vary altogether from the problems created by algo-
rithms used in social media platforms. Even when it comes 
just to social media, the range of problems is highly diverse, 
9  See, e.g. Social Media at Crossroads: 25 Solutions from the Social Media Summit @MIT, sOCiaL mEDia sUmmit @ mit (2021) https://www.
yumpu.com/en/document/read/65717082/the-smsmit-report. 
10  European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on 
Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) And Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts (April 4, 2021), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/le-
gal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1623335154975&uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0206. 
11  Cary Coglianese & André Sapir, Risk and Regulatory Calibration: WTO Compliance Review of the U.S. Dolphin-Safe Tuna Labeling Re-
gime, 16 wOrLD traDE rEv., 327-348 (2017); Cary Coglianese, Listening Learning Leading: A Framework for Regulatory Excellence, Penn 
Program on Regulation, 44-46 (2015), https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Listening-Learning-Leading_Cogli-
anese-1.pdf; Cary Coglianese & Gary Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. Pa. L. r., 1255 (2004).
including concerns over privacy intrusions, the propagation 
of misinformation, the facilitation of hate speech and cyber-
bullying, and various ill effects on children and teens.9
In Europe, there appears to be some effort to recognize 
such differences, as the EU’s proposed regulation on arti-
ficial intelligence distinguishes between high-risk and low-
risk uses of the technology.10 But risk itself can be a slippery 
notion.11 Even when understood squarely as the probabil-
ity of harm, the probabilities and the harms are often not 
yet clearly understood—an inherent problem with anything 
new. Even when the harms are known, they can vary widely 
across different applications. The harms that can arise from 
fintech, for example, are hardly the same kind of potential 
harms presented by precision medicine, even when they 
both are driven by machine-learning algorithms.
Moreover, with most types of regulation, risks are only part of 
the equation when it comes to defining the regulatory prob-
lem. The risks of new tech need to be considered in light of 
the benefits of these technologies. Autonomous vehicles, for 
example, will present risks of accidents, some of which might 
not have occurred with human drivers; however, autonomous 
transportation also promises to reduce the overall level of ac-
cidents and to decrease energy usage. Regulators need to 
take account of all these effects—the bad and the good.
Other technologies promise improvements too, even while 
they also create other potential side effects or spillovers. 
Part of the process of problem definition demands some 
appreciation for how tradeoffs should be made, such that 
a sufficient reduction in the harms from new technologies 
can be achieved without unduly undermining the benefi-
cial effects of these innovations. 
These are tough issues that, to be sure, have long vexed 
regulators in other settings. What is distinctively diffi-
cult about the regulatory challenges related to new tech, 
though, is that the definitions of the ultimate problems re-
mains unsettled, if not even changing as technology chang-
es. And those problems are highly varied. Regulating new 
tech means not merely recognizing that a one-size-fits-all 
regulatory solution will prove elusive; rather, it demands ac-
knowledging that the nature of the regulatory problems are 
themselves varied and changing, both across and within 
different technologies and applications. 
What we might consider new tech’s “problem” problem, 
then, is simply the fact that regulators face a plethora of di-
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verse problems and that societal expectations about regu-
latory goals are often still emerging at the same time as new 
tech continues to evolve, with too little guidance over pri-
orities and tradeoffs. Some of the problems with new tech 
also cut across existing regulatory jurisdictions and even at 
times may fail to fall within the ambit of any current regu-
latory body’s authority. And for many new tech problems, 
there exists too little understanding of the of causes regula-
tory problems nor of the potential for unanticipated conse-
quences from regulation itself. 
03
SOLVING NEW TECH 
PROBLEMS
The heterogeneity and dynamism of new technologies does 
not mean that nothing can or should be done today to regulate 
new and emerging technologies. Problems need not be de-
fined permanently, fully, or with complete precision for govern-
ment to intervene in markets. But the diverse, changing nature 
of new tech’s problems does certainly pose challenges for 
regulators and ultimately it may drive their selection of regula-
tory strategies. The strategies that have proven workable and 
effective for older technologies and more static, better-studied 
sectors are not likely to work nearly as well for new tech.
A. Markets as Regulators?
One response to varied, and even vague, conceptions of 
new tech’s problems would be to seek to leverage market 
forces. Rather than have a government regulator need to 
define the problems with new tech, and then put in place 
regulations to solve them all, the basic regulatory function 
could be left to consumers who could pressure firms to re-
duce potential harms. Consumers could freely choose from 
among competing firms and products those that they think 
best address their harms. 
The desire to leverage market forces is certainly part of the 
impetus behind calls for greater antitrust scrutiny of big 
12  See, e.g. amy kLObUChar, aNtitrUst: takiNg ON mONOPOLy POwEr frOm thE giLDED agE tO thE DigitaL agE 175-214 (1st ED. 2021).
13  See, e.g. fOrEst L. rEiNharDt, DOwN tO Earth: aPPLyiNg bUsiNEss PriNCiPLEs tO ENvirONmENtaL maNagEmENt (2000).
14  See, e.g. Gary E. Marchant et al., Governing Emerging Technologies Through Soft Law: Lessons for Artificial Intelligence, 61 JUrimEt-
riCs, 1-18 (2020).
15 One of the market failures justifying regulation, of course, might well be a lack of sufficient market competition in the relevant technol-
ogy sector. For an argument that regulation is needed to ensure adequate competition among digital platforms, see William P. Rogerson & 
Howard Shelanski, Antitrust Enforcement, Regulation, and Digital Platforms, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1911 (2020).
tech firms today.12 The thinking is that, if companies such 
as Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google faced more vig-
orous competition, then they might do more to protect con-
sumers’ data or guard against other social and economic 
harms arising from their tech products and services.
Consumers could freely choose from among 
competing firms and products those that they 
think best address their harms 
This way of thinking certainly has some merit. Monopolists 
have less reason to deliver everything that consumers want. 
Market pressures from consumers and investors, on the 
other hand, can indeed lead companies to reduce certain 
types of problems that concern both consumers and regu-
lators.13 And in some instances, self-regulation or “soft law” 
professional norms may well help moderate firm behavior.14
Yet in the face of genuine market failures or other regula-
tory problems, there seems little reason to be optimistic that 
market pressures by themselves can entirely eliminate the 
need for regulatory interventions15. 
For one thing, for competitive pressures to work, the market 
actors — such as consumers and investors — need relevant 
and credible information on which to base their decisions. 
And yet information asymmetries — a classic market failure 
problem — surely exist with new technologies and will ne-
cessitate regulatory intervention to ensure , if nothing else, 
adequate and accurate disclosure of information to con-
sumers and investors. Determining exactly what informa-
tion needs to be disclosed, and then auditing to make sure 
disclosed information is accurate, will demand that regula-
tors define problems clearly and assess how well disclosed 
information captures those problems.
But in addition, there is little reason to think that just the dis-
closure of information will always drive new tech firms to de-
sign and deploy their products and services in a sufficiently 
socially responsible manner. After all, with respect to other 
problems of information asymmetries, information disclosure 
is often not enough. Many consumers do not read the fine 
print or otherwise pay attention to the compelled disclosure of 
information — even when the disclosure is simple and readily 
6 © 2021 Competition Policy International All Rights Reserved
available.16 With respect to modern technology, the relevant 
disclosures might well need to be complex or technical, mak-
ing it difficult for consumers to base their decisions on the 
information. The regulation of pharmaceuticals, for example, 
is justified as a solution to an information asymmetry problem 
but it does not rest solely on the disclosure of information. 
Instead, an entire system has been developed to test drugs 
for safety and efficacy that essentially relies on sophisticated 
regulators and their advisors to stand in for consumers. 
Moreover, even if consumers did act on complete information, 
a competitive marketplace is not likely to prove sufficient to 
achieve the socially optimal resolution of all the problems with 
big tech. For example, when these problems are ones of true 
externalities — such as, say, with systemic risks to the econ-
omy that might conceivably be created by certain types of 
algorithmic transactions, cryptocurrencies or fintech products 
— then by definition consumers are not going to put sufficient 
pressure on companies. In short, since a regulatory problem 
is inherently one that markets by themselves will not solve ad-
equately, then some kind of regulatory intervention will likely 
be needed even in a more competitive tech environment. 
B. The Problem-Pathway Framework
A regulatory intervention seeks to change the behavior of 
firms and their managers so that it reduces targeted prob-
lems. In seeking to shape the behavior of those who design 
and deploy new technologies, regulators can certainly take 
advantage of new technologies themselves to improve their 
work.17 But even with the use of automated forms of regulato-
ry oversight, regulators will still need to rely on the strategies 
upon which regulators have drawn in the past for shaping 
human behavior — although with some different emphases.
These strategies can be distilled to their essence. By either 
commanding action or results, regulators can seek to ori-
ent the behavior of regulated individuals and entities toward 
either (1) solving an ultimate problem themselves, or (2) 
adopting behavior that will interrupt specific causal path-
ways that lead to an ultimate problem.18 
A regulatory intervention seeks to change the 
behavior of firms and their managers so that it 
reduces targeted problems 
16  See, e.g. Omri bEN-shahar & CarL E. sChNEiDEr, mOrE thaN yOU waNtED tO kNOw: thE faiLUrE Of maNDatED DisCLOsUrE (2014).
17  See, e.g. Cary Coglianese & Alicia Lai, Antitrust by Algorithm, staN. J. COmPUtatiONaL aNtitrUst (forthcoming); Cary Coglianese & David 
Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision-Making in the Machine Learning Era, 105 Geo. L. J. 1147 (2017).
18  Cary Coglianese, Management-Based Regulation: Implications for Public Policy, in risk aND rEgULatOry POLiCy: imPrOviNg thE gOvErNaNCE 
Of risk (grEgOry bOUNDs & NikOLai maLyshEv, EDs., 2010); NatiONaL aCaDEmiEs Of sCiENCEs, ENgiNEEriNg & mEDiCiNE, DEsigNiNg safEty rEgULatiONs 
fOr high-hazarD iNDUstriEs (2018), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24907/designing-safety-regulations-for-high-hazard-industries.
19  National Academies of Sciences, supra note 19, at 23, 32, 90.
The first of these approaches demands, at a minimum, that 
the regulator be able to define a problem with sufficient clar-
ity or know that it has arisen and caused someone harm. 
The second demands both clarity about the problem and 
a sound understanding of its causes.  By understanding 
the causes of problems, the regulator can identify the ma-
jor pathways that lead to their generation and then impose, 
and monitor compliance with, rules demanding actions or 
results aimed at blocking off those pathways. 
Take, as a simple example, the problem of injuries and fatalities 
from automobile accidents. The first approach focuses on the 
accidents themselves—such as by imposing an overall obli-
gation on drivers to drive safely and holding them liable when 
they cause injuries to others. The second approach comprises 
various vehicle safety equipment standards and traffic laws, 
such as speed limits and stop signs, that can block the path-
ways leading to accidents and injuries in the first place. 
The dichotomy between regulations directing attention at 
ultimate problems versus those directed at pathways to the 
ultimate problems helps reveal the basic strategies avail-
able to regulators in an era of new tech. These are the same 
strategies that have long been deployed by regulators; they 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive and can be com-
bined when regulating the same or different problems that 
they create.19 And as in any regulatory domain, and with 
respect to any regulatory problem, each of these strategies 
will have both advantages and disadvantages, especially 
relative to the others. 
In the case of new tech, regulatory strategies that mandate 
action or results along specific pathways may be the least 
appealing option, simply because these pathways are still 
being understood and are likely changing as technology 
changes. Moreover, too much interference on the pathways 
may also risk stifling technological innovation, which could 
have its own ill effects.
C. Problem-Based Liability
A natural starting point, then, would be simply to impose li-
ability on tech firms when problems develop from their tech-
nology —just as negligent drivers are held liable when they 
injure others. This is one of the oldest strategies for shaping 
behavior and solving regulatory problems as it can help focus 
firms’ attention on avoiding an ultimate problem that causes 
harm. Such liability can be imposed either through general 
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products liability rules or through what regulators sometimes 
call the general duty clauses within legal codes.20 
No matter the source of liability, under this strategy tech 
firms would have an obligation to avoid an ultimate prob-
lem, whether fatalities, the loss of funds, or other harms. 
When the ultimate problem manifests itself due to a firm’s 
actions (or inactions), the firm needs either to compensate 
for the harm, pay a penalty, or both. These financial costs 
can be imposed on the firm automatically whenever the firm 
causes harm, or only when the harm arises from the firm 
acted negligently by failing to exercise reasonable care. Ei-
ther way, because firms know that they can be held liable 
after the fact when their products or services cause harm, 
they have some incentive to focus on avoiding that harm 
— a greater incentive than if they were not subject to the 
background risk of problem-based liability.
Of course, many new tech firms are in fact already exposed 
to problem-based liability. This shows how liability is a rela-
tively tractable strategy from the standpoint of the regulator, 
for the problem need be stated in only the most general of 
terms. Once harm occurs, the problem has not only mani-
fested but also practically defined itself — rather than the 
regulator needing to do so ex ante. As a result, in terms of 
feasibility for the government, the notion of ex post liability 
would seem a viable strategy to deploy in the context of 
new tech, where problems are varied and changing. 
Businesses often balk at being held to such liability and they 
would certainly prefer to avoid it. Indeed, social media and 
other platform companies have successfully won immunity 
from much of this liability under Section 230 of the federal 
Communications Act.21 Others have suggested that autono-
mous vehicle manufacturers should similarly escape from nor-
mal liability rules.22 But as much as businesses may bristle at 
being held accountable after harms do occur, there is also the 
argument that such liability may actually treat them too softly. 
Liability does have its limits as a regulatory strategy. It ul-
timately takes on faith that firms’ managers will sufficiently 
internalize the possibility of being held liable at some future 
time and then will be motivated to change their firms’ cur-
rent behavior in ways that sufficiently address the underly-
ing regulatory problem. But for several reasons — including 
cognitive biases, insurance coverage, and bankruptcy — 
these future risks of liability are often not enough to induce 
sufficient behavioral change in the present.   
20  For an example of a general duty clause, see 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (“Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees employment 
and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm 
to his employees.”)
21  47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
22  James M. Anderson, et al., Autonomous Vehicle Technology: A Guide for Policymakers xxiii (2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/re-
search_reports/RR443-2.html. 
D. Regulating Pathways
Because the backdrop of liability is often perceived as de-
livering less than the socially optimal level of protection, 
regulators have traditionally spent much effort seeking to 
identify the causes of regulatory problems and then impos-
ing rules that seek to impede these causal pathways. 
The longer a technology has been around, and the more 
stable it is, the more feasible it is for regulators to target 
pathways. Building codes, for example, are grounded in ex-
tensive general knowledge that has been developed over 
centuries, as well as on specific engineering research which 
justify mandates that builders use fire-resistant materials 
and install fire suppression technologies. These mandates 
target the multiple pathways that lead to property damage 
and injuries and fatalities from building fires. Much the same 
can be said for other regimes regulating older forms of tech-
nology and economic activity. As noted, traditional automo-
bile safety regulation puts in place rules that address the 
multiple pathways that can lead to vehicle accidents: driver 
errors, vehicle malfunctions, and roadway hazards.
As much as it is feasible to target pathways when regulating 
buildings or automobiles, the same will not always be true 
when it comes to regulating new tech. New tech’s “prob-
lem” problem means that regulators will often be behind the 
curve in understanding the causes of regulatory problems 
and in being able sufficiently to target their pathways. This 
does not mean, of course, that regulators will never be able 
to impose pathway-related obligations on new tech firms. 
For example, it almost surely makes sense for regulators to 
consider imposing a requirement that all technology firms 
use differential privacy techniques to protect sensitive infor-
mation contained in datasets that they use. Similarly, when 
it comes to cybersecurity risks, regulators can likely identify 
specific security measures that firms ought to implement, 
such as multi-factor authentication. 
The more that regulators learn about a technology, the more 
able they will be to identify pathways to target with regula-
tion. As such, regulators can and should invest in substantial 
research to learn more about the technology they oversee, 
and the causal pathways leading to their problems. Still, even 
with additional research, new tech will likely always present 
distinctive challenges for regulators when it comes to un-
derstanding pathways and regulating them. Regulators will 
know less than firms do about their technologies — and thus 
regulators will always be relatively disadvantaged when it 
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comes to knowing what measures to require or what outputs 
to measure to interrupt the pathways to their problems.23
The longer a technology has been around, and 
the more stable it is, the more feasible it is for 
regulators to target pathways 
E. Mandating a Focus on Problems
Regulators can seek to leverage firms’ informational ad-
vantages for the public good through a type of regulatory 
strategy known as management-based regulation.24 Man-
agement-based regulation requires firms to engage in the 
study of their own operations, products, and services, all 
to get firms thinking harder about the risks they create and 
then identifying measures they can take to manage these 
risks better. 
The management-based approach to regulation is used 
around the world to address problems where it is difficult 
to define or measure outcomes or where pathway preven-
tion does not come neatly organized in a one-size-fits-all 
package. For example, management-based regulation has 
been applied to address issues of food safety, chemical ac-
cidents, toxic pollution, financial fraud, and the safety of 
offshore energy development —all regulatory domains with 
considerable heterogeneity in regulated entities and where 
outcomes, such as risk, are difficult to assess on a routine 
basis.25 For these same reasons, management-based regu-
lation seems likely to be an oft-desired approach to regulat-
ing new tech given the diversity and dynamism within most 
technology markets today. 
The aim of management-based regulation is to induce 
firms’ managers to address their own technologies’ prob-
lems. Rather than telling a firm exactly what measures to 
23 Regulators do, of course, have some strategies and tactics available to them to try to elicit information from industry. See Cary Cogli-
anese, Richard Zeckhauser, and Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policy Making, 89 Minn. 
L. Rev. 277 (2004).
24  Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & sOC’y 
rEv. 691 (2003).
25  Cary Coglianese & Shana Starobin, Management-Based Regulation, in POLiCy iNstrUmENts iN ENvirONmENtaL Law 292-307 (kENNEth r. 
riCharDs aND JOsEPhiNE vaN zEbEN, EDs., 2020).
26  See, e.g. John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 miCh. L. rEv. 1466 (1982); briDgEt 
hUttEr, rEgULatiON aND risk: OCCUPatiONaL hEaLth aND safEty ON thE raiLways (2001).
27  Lori S. Bennear, Are Management-based Regulations Effective? Evidence from State Pollution Prevention Programs 26 J. POL’y aNaLysis 
& mgmt. 327 (2007).
28  Travis Minor & Matt Parrett, The Economic Impact of the Food and Drug Administration’s Final Juice HACCP Rule, 68 fOOD POL’y 206 (2017).
adopt to solve a regulatory problem, management-based 
regulation compels firms to assess how their own prod-
ucts and operations contribute to the problem and then 
to develop their own internal plans, procedures, and other 
steps aimed at solving the problem. This regulatory strat-
egy does not by itself require firms to take any specific 
actions beyond the managerial actions of planning, analy-
sis, and the establishment of internal procedures. In fact, 
some management-based regulations only require firms to 
identify internal actions to take to control risks, not even to 
implement these actions or the required internal plans and 
procedures that they develop. The threat of ex post liability, 
of course, gives firms a reason to implement the plans they 
develop.
Management-based regulation, which sometimes called 
mandated or enforced self-regulation,26 has been shown to 
work in practice. One study compared toxic pollution from 
facilities in U.S. states with management-based pollution 
prevention laws and found and without that facilities locat-
ed in states with these laws reduced their toxic pollution 
more than facilities in other states, at least for the first six 
years after management-based regulations had been ad-
opted.27 Another study demonstrated a reduction in food-
borne illnesses associated with the adoption of manage-
ment-based food safety regulations.28
A management-based approach to regulation seems well-
suited for new tech because, when different technologies 
can lead to different problems, this approach takes some of 
the pressure off regulators to identify and define problems 
with precision. It places more of an onus on firms, while 
keeping the regulator working at arms length to oversee the 
industry’s management efforts. It also gives firms flexibility 
to find the most cost-effective ways to solve the problems 
that they identify. Admittedly, it is not entirely flexible, as 
it is mandatory regulation; it does require compliance with 
specified management steps — often characterized under 
the quality management rubric of “plan-do-check-act.” But 
other than the required management steps, management-
based regulation imposes on the firms themselves the 
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responsibility of identifying their own specific risk control 
measures, procedures, and responses.29 
When it comes to regulating new tech, this flexibility that 
management-based regulation affords is important be-
cause it allows firms to innovate. It is thus hardly surpris-
ing to see proposals for requiring certain kinds of new tech 
firms to conduct algorithmic audits — an idea that fits well 
within the framework of management-based regulation.30 
Similarly, it is not surprising that the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has recommended 
that manufacturers of automated driving systems (ADSs) 
adopt management-based “safety assessments” that are 
designed to ensure that their engineering teams are more 
fully focused on the ultimate problem of accident avoid-
ance.31
The suitability of a management-based regulatory strategy 
for new tech does not mean it will not face some chal-
lenges. The regulator needs to ensure that firms take their 
required management responsibilities seriously. Especially 
with the passage of time, management-based require-
ments risk turning into empty paperwork exercises rather 
than serious attempts to identify, analyze, and manage 
problems.32 Access to information and ongoing vigilance 
by the regulator is thus necessary.33 Regulatory agencies 
must have auditors who know how to distinguish between 
firms that engage in meaningful management efforts and 
those that treat managerial requirements as simply a box-
checking ritual.34 In short, regulating new tech via man-
agement-based regulation requires having the right kind of 
regulatory resources in place — especially the necessary 
human capital.
29  Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 25.
30  See, e.g. Miles Brundage et al., Toward Trustworthy AI Development: Mechanisms for Supporting Verifiable Claims (April 2020); James 
Guszcza et al., Why We Need to Audit Algorithms, harv. bUs. rEv. (NOv. 28, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/11/why-we-need-to-audit-algo-
rithms; JOshUa krOLL Et aL., AccountAble Algorithms, 165 U. Pa. L. rEv. 633 (2017).
31  NHTSA, Automated Driving Systems 2.0: A Vision for Safety 16 (2017), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/docu-
ments/13069a-ads2.0_090617_v9a_tag.pdf. 
32  See, e.g. Garry C. Gray & Susan S. Silbey, Governing Inside the Organization: Interpreting Regulation and Compliance, 120 amEr. J. 
sOC. 96 (2014).
33  Cary Coglianese, Regulatory Abdication in Practice, 79 PUb. aDmiN. rEv. 794 (2019).
34  National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & Medicine, supra note 19, at 133-137.
35  Cary Coglianese, Regulatory Excellence as “People Excellence,” rEg. rEv. (OCt. 23, 2015), https://www.theregreview.org/2015/10/23/
coglianese-people-excellence/.
36  Coglianese, supra note 19, at 179-180.
37  Coglianese, supra note 3, at 10-11; Coglianese & Lai, supra note 18
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PEOPLE ARE KEY, EVEN WITH 
TECH
Finding the right kind of people should be a running theme 
in any discussion of the regulation of new tech.35 To regulate 
well, agencies need analytically sophisticated staff mem-
bers. These staff members must work constantly to keep 
abreast of developments in their fields, especially if they 
hope to regulate any of the pathways to problems. 
Even though management-based regulation leverages the in-
formation advantages of the firms, regulators still must know 
enough to be able to gauge how seriously firms take their 
management obligations. This requires personnel who know 
more than just how to check boxes on a checklist or inspec-
tion form. Regulatory staff members need to have strong skills 
in risk analysis as it applies to the technology they oversee.36 
Given the pace of change with technology, regulatory per-
sonnel need to find ways to monitor and analyze innovations 
no matter what kind of regulatory strategy they adopt. To reg-
ulate well, they must understand technology markets and the 
pathways to the problems that different technologies create. 
And if regulators are themselves to rely on certain technolo-
gies — so-called regtech tools — their organizations need 
the right kind of people who can design and deploy those 
tools successfully within their specific regulatory settings.37
Unfortunately, government confronts serious shortfalls in its 
technology-oriented talent pool at present — and the com-
petition with the private sector for technically sophisticated 
staff will remain fierce. The federal government currently 
faces a dramatic turnover in due to an aging workforce — a 
trend that is problematic for the regulation of older tech-
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nologies, where experience can be a premium. But perhaps 
this turnover affords an opportunity for building regulatory 
staffs capable of overseeing new tech markets. Regulatory 
agencies need to develop channels for bringing in new tal-
ent with the analytic capabilities needed to oversee today’s 
innovative market environment.38 
Unfortunately, government confronts serious 
shortfalls in its technology-oriented talent pool 
at present — and the competition with the pri-
vate sector for technically sophisticated staff 
will remain fierce
Of course, government’s own technological infrastructure 
needs upgrading as well. Too many federal computer sys-
tems in the United States remain woefully out of date. The 
U.S. Government Accountability Office reported as recently 
as five years ago that three-quarters of federal spending on 
information technology supports old “legacy systems” which 
“are becoming increasingly obsolete” due to “outdated soft-
ware languages and hardware parts that are unsupported.”39 
In addition to updating antiquated hardware, steps are need-
ed to build a robust, usable data infrastructures, such as by 
creating common identifiers that can link disparate datasets, 
building adequate data storage capabilities, and ensuring 
effective cybersecurity protections.40
With new and better technological capacities, regulatory 
agencies can then allocate their human capital more optimally. 
Machine-learning algorithms, for example, can help regulators 
improve the targeting of regulated firms to inspect or audit.41 
Regulators may find that they can improve their performance 
by leveraging firms’ own data for analytical purposes too.42 
38  Recently, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has announced an initiative to improve its ability to recruit cybersecurity talent. U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, DHS Launches Innovative Hiring Program to Recruit and Retain World-Class Cyber Talent (Nov. 15, 2021), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/11/15/dhs-launches-innovative-hiring-program-recruit-and-retain-world-class-cyber-talent. In addition, the 
National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) has urged in a congressionally mandated report that the federal government 
create a U.S. Digital Service Academy that “should be modeled off of the five U.S. military service academies but produce trained and edu-
cated government civilians for all federal government departments and agencies.” NSCAI, Final Report 127 (2021), https://www.nscai.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf. See also U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, Digital Services: Considerations 
for a Federal Academy to Develop a Pipeline of Digital Staff (Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105388.pdf.
39  Federal Agencies Need to Address Aging Legacy Systems: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 
(2016) (testimony of David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677454.pdf. 
40  Cary Coglianese & Alicia Lai, Assessing Automated Administration, in OxfOrD haNDbOOk Of ai gOvErNaNCE (JUstiN bULLOCk Et aL., EDs., 
fOrthCOmiNg).
41  See, e.g. Miyuki Hino, Elinor Benami, & Nina Brooks, Enhancing Environmental Monitoring Through Machine Learning, 1 NatUrE sUstaiN-
abiLity 583, 583-584 (2018).
42 Coglianese & Lai, supra note 18.
43  See, e.g. maLCOLm sParrOw, thE rEgULatOry Craft: CONtrOLLiNg risks, sOLviNg PrObLEms, aND maNagiNg COmPLiaNCE (2000); mark h. mOOrE, 
CrEatiNg PUbLiC vaLUE: stratEgiC maNagEmENt iN gOvErNmENt (1995). See also Cary Coglianese, Regulatory Vigilance in a Changing World, rEg. 
rEv. (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/02/25/coglianese-innovation-regulatory-vigilance/.
In addition to possessing technical sophistication, the 
people who staff regulatory agencies also must have skills 
needed to interact productively with other people in their 
orbit, particularly the managers and employees within reg-
ulated technology firms but also with various interested 
members of the public and with legislative overseers. 
Successful regulation is ultimately more relational than 
technological. It is about changing human behavior, build-
ing credibility, and displaying the fairness and empathy that 
promotes trust. It demands a workforce that is steadfast 
in its commitment to public service and eager to remain 
vigilant in seeking to solve problems and thereby making a 
meaningful, positive impact on society.43
Because new tech is new, the pathways will not 
always be well-understood, which will limit the 
ability to regulate in traditional ways
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CONCLUSION
The present era of rapid innovation in technology promises 
to deliver improvements in both economic productivity and 
the quality of daily life. But just as with any type of change, 
innovations in new tech bring with them the potential for 
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problems. Regulators will inevitably be given responsibility 
for solving these problems, and when they seek to intervene 
in the technological marketplace, they will need to draw on 
a toolkit that regulators have long used to change behavior 
and reduce harms. 
That toolkit contains strategies that seek to induce firms to 
focus on the underlying problems their technologies create, 
as well as strategies that target specific pathways to these 
problems. Because new tech is new, the pathways will not 
always be well-understood, which will limit the ability to 
regulate in traditional ways. This means that regulators are 
increasingly likely to look to strategies such as ex post li-
ability and management-based regulation. These strategies 
will seek to shape firms’ incentives and steer their manag-
ers’ attention toward the ultimate problems associated with 
different technologies, rather than forcing them to comply 
with discrete prescriptions aimed at the pathways to these 
problems. In this way, regulating new tech is likely to look 
a bit different, and provide regulated firms with more flex-
ibility, than older domains of regulation.
No matter whether they regulate in ways oriented more to-
ward ultimate problems or their pathways, though, regula-
tory agencies need to strengthen the skills and knowledge 
of their workforces. Even when agencies themselves rely on 
modern technologies to help with their work, they will need 
staffs with the technological sophistication to design and 
use these tools well.44 Perhaps ironically, the most impor-
tant ingredient for success in regulating new tech will not be 
technology. It will be people. 
44  Coglianese, supra note 3.
